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Chapter One 
The Concept of Illegal, Unregulated, and Unreported Fishing 
 
 
1.1  General Background  
The importance of the fisheries sector to world sustenance is extensive, ranging from being 
a source of employment and protein for subsistence farmers, particularly in developing 
countries, to providing social and economic opportunities for food security and 
environmental protection.1 It is estimated that the fisheries sector assures the livelihoods of 
10 per cent to 12 per cent of the world’s population.2 Most countries have, however, 
neglected to formulate effective policies to manage this sector and to give it adequate 
attention, despite its value to the health and wealth of a nation. The need to devote more 
attention to the fisheries sector is pressing, given the rising demand for fish, which has 
resulted in over-exploitation of fish reserves. De Coning and Witbooi postulate that ‘85% of 
worldwide fish stocks are now over and fully exploited, with 53% being fully exploited, 
therefore these fisheries cannot be expanded’.3 This, in turn, has led to difficulties in 
maintaining ecosystems.4 This over-exploitation of fish and other edible fresh water 
                                                          
1              Finegold C ‘The importance of fisheries and aquaculture to development’ (2009), available at 
                http://pubs.iclarm.net/resource_centre/WF_2546.pdf (accessed 17 April 2016). 
 
2  Bondaroff T, van der Werf W & Reitano T The Illegal Fishing and Organized Crime nexus: Illegal Fishing 
as a Transnational Organized Crime (2015) 14 Global Initiative Against Transnational Crime, available 
at  http://theblackfish.org/Fishing_Crime.pdf (accessed 17 April 2016). 
 
3   De Coning E and Witbooi E ‘Towards a new fisheries crime paradigm: South Africa as an illustrative  
example’ (2015) Marine Policy, available at 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X1500189X (accessed 8 July 2016). 
 
4  See generally FAO ‘The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture Opportunities and challenges’ FAO  
(2014), available at  http://www.fao.org/3/a-i3720e.pdf (accessed 15 April 2016). 
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resources is not restricted to small-scale inland fishing activities, but extends also to the 
oceans.  
The issue goes beyond depletion of fish populations and the adverse impact this has on the 
environment, as stated in various reports by agencies such as the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation (FAO) of the United Nations (UN), which indicate the increasing threat of 
illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing.5  This threat is heightened to the extent 
that IUU fishing is usually connected with other crime in the fishing industry, such as drug 
smuggling and human trafficking, commonly referred to as fisheries crime, which has come 
to assume  a transnational nature. Fisheries-related crime has been characterised as a low-
risk, high-reward undertaking with an economic incentive, thus increasingly attracting the 
participation of organised criminal groups.6 Consequently, there is an increased global need 
to curb IUU fishing and give it a legal definition, determining which type of conduct 
constitutes IUU fishing and how it is related to other transnational organised fisheries crime. 
1.2 What is IUU Fishing? 
The phrase IUU fishing was coined by the Commission for Conservation of Antarctic Marine 
Living Resources (CCAMLR) in its 1997 report.7 It recognised the problem of non-compliant 
fishers, classifying their activity as ‘illegal, unreported and unregulated’.  A narrow definition 
of IUU fishing is fishing which does not comply with national, regional or global fisheries 
                                                          
5  FAO (2014) 1. 
 
6              Baird RJ Aspects of Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (2006) 8.  
 
7              Baird (2006) 8. 
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conservation and management obligations’,8 occurring both on the high seas and inland 
coastal fisheries. Often, the term IUU fishing is generic in nature. It is used to describe the 
fishing activity which contravenes conservation and management obligations, rather than 
drawing a distinction between the various activities. This is evident in the FAO’s 
International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU),9 the first international legal instrument seeking to regulate 
IUU fishing. It does not define IUU fishing or give it any form of legal characterisation; rather 
it gives the broad scope and nature of illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing.10 
Illegal fishing entails contravention of existing, sanctioned activity at national, regional, or 
international level by national or foreign vessels.11 Unreported fishing includes misreporting 
or failing to report activities where there is an obligation to do so, nationally or regionally. 12  
This includes failure to adhere to the reporting procedures of a regional fisheries 
                                                          
8  Stølsvik CG ‘Transnational organised fisheries crime as a maritime security issue’ (2008), available at 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/consultative_process/documents/9_gunnarstolsvikabstract.pdf 
(accessed 14 April 2016). 
 
9               International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated 
                 Fishing (IPOA-IUU) adopted by the 25th session of the FAO Committee on Fisheries on 2 March 
                 2001. 
 
10             Section 3, of the IPOA-IUU. 
 
11            “3.1 Illegal fishing refers to activities: 
 3.1.1 conducted by national or foreign vessels in waters under the jurisdiction of a State, without the 
permission of that State, or in contravention of its laws and regulations; 
3.1.2 conducted by vessels flying the flag of States that are parties to a relevant regional fisheries 
management organization but operate in contravention of the conservation and management 
measures adopted by that organization and by which the States are bound, or relevant provisions of 
the applicable international law; or 
3.1.3 in violation of national laws or international obligations, including those undertaken by 
cooperating States to a relevant regional fisheries management organization.” 
 
12            “3.2 Unreported fishing refers to fishing activities: 
               3.2.1 which have not been reported, or have been misreported, to the relevant national authority, in    
contravention of national laws and regulations; or 
3.2.2 undertaken in the area of competence of a relevant regional fisheries management organization    
which have not been reported or have been misreported, in contravention of the reporting 
procedures of that organization.” 
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management organization (RFMO).13 The third component of IUU fishing is unregulated 
fishing. It includes the contravention of conservation and management obligations of an 
RFMO by stateless vessels or vessels of states that are not parties to the relevant RFMO, as 
well as activities which are beyond the jurisdiction of any RFMO or state but which threaten 
marine living resources.14  
The IPOA-IUU is beneficial, despite its non-binding nature, as it reiterates IUU fishing 
obligations and provides a broader scope for classifying IUU fishing activities. Essentially, its 
effectiveness lies in the comprehensive regulations for preventing, deterring, and 
eliminating IUU fishing, particularly the ability of national and RFMOs to detect IUU fishing 
activity and sanction it. This is discussed further in the next chapter. One of its limitations, 
however, is its lack of consistency in drawing a distinction between illegal, unreported, and 
unregulated fishing. Thus, proposed measures to address each component are conflated 
and unclear. IUU fishing is not only used generically to refer to any of the three components, 
but in practice is also often conflated with fisheries crime, which is not addressed in the 
IPOA-IUU. There is, however, a need to draw a distinction, if possible, as well as to identify 
which activity constitutes IUU fishing.  
 
 
                                                          
13  RFMOs are a collection of countries within a proximity that have shared fishing or financial interest. 
 
14   “3.3 Unregulated fishing refers to fishing activities: 
                 3.3.1 in the area of application of a relevant regional fisheries management organization that are  
conducted by vessels without nationality, or by those flying the flag of a State not party to that 
organization, or by a fishing entity, in a manner that is not consistent with or contravenes the  
conservation and management measures of that organization; or 
                 3.3.2 in areas or for fish stocks in relation to which there are no applicable conservation or  
management measures and where such fishing activities are conducted in a manner inconsistent with 
State responsibilities for the conservation of living marine resources under international law.” 
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1.3 Nexus with Fisheries Crime 
The actual legal characterisation of IUU fishing as a proposed transnational crime has yet to 
be settled. A detailed issue paper by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 
formulates a link between IUU fishing and other organised crime, particularly trafficking in 
persons, smuggling of migrants and illicit trafficking in narcotics.15 The link between IUU 
fishing and organised crime is said to be twofold: engagement in fisheries crime such as the 
case of abalone poaching in South Africa by transnational organised crime syndicates; and 
legally present fishing operators engaging in parallel criminal fishing activities such as 
underreporting of blue tuna fish catches.16 This evidences the use of the fishing industry as a 
target of organised crime. It is, however, uncertain to what extent IUU fishing violates a 
protected interest which justifies making it a crime, or whether such violation is dependent 
on the link with organised crime, which will be explored further in Chapter 3 of the study. 
Fisheries crime is a concept that is legally ill-defined but can be said to be an all-
encompassing term that includes illegal fishing activities and other known organised crime 
such as money laundering, document fraud, and narcotics and human trafficking conducted 
through the fisheries sector.17 For instance, drug trafficking by a vessel in an RFMO is 
criminalised because drug trafficking is internationally branded as a crime, and is subject to 
criminal sanction. By contrast, where vessels of states belonging to an RFMO engaging in 
parallel criminal activity such as fish laundering and misreporting catches, this practice 
                                                          
15        United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Report on Transnational Organized Crime in the Fishing 
Industry (2011) UNODC. 
 
16             De Coning (2015) 211. 
 
17             United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Fisheries crime: bringing to light the perfect storm of illegal  
activities in the fishing sector (2016), available at 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2016/May/fisheries-crime_-bringing-to-light-the-
perfect-storm-of-illegal-activities-in-the-fishing-sector.html (accessed 18 June 2016). 
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would constitute IUU fishing under the auspices of the IPOA-IUU and subject to a civil fine. 
The IPOA-IUU does not prescribe specific sanctions for IUU fishing, but leaves it up to states 
to impose sanctions. This, suggests the use of a civil sanction regime,18 indicating that IUU 
fishing activities are subject to administrative regulation as opposed to the criminal 
sanctions imposed on its ancillary crimes. These examples indicate the importance of 
classifying to know which instrument applies and what sanctions are applicable. The leading 
school of thought, however, advocates for a classification of IUU fishing as part of fisheries 
crime, together with transnational organised fishing activities and related offences, as 
illustrated in the diagram overleaf.19   
 
Source: de Coning E ‘Transnational organized fisheries crime’ 
                                                          
18  Section 21 of the IPOA-IUU. 
 
19       De Coning E ‘Transnational organized fisheries crime: INTERPOL project SCALE and INTERPOL ad hoc  
Working Group on Fisheries Crime’, available at 
https://www.ccamlr.org/en/system/files/Day%202%20-%20Session%203%20-
%20Transnational%20Organized%20Fisheries%20Crime%20-%20Eve%20de%20Conning.pdf (accessed 
20 June 2016). 
IUU
Transnational 
Organized 
Fisheries Crime
Related 
Offences: 
• Tax and 
customs 
fraud 
•Corruption 
• Fraud 
• Human 
trafficking 
• Money 
laundering 
Predicate 
Offences 
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The lacuna in this approach is the continued use of IUU fishing generically and the lack of 
clarity as to which activities particularly are already criminalised and which are regulatory. 
Perhaps an examination of the national strategies adopted by various countries may offer 
better guidance on this. Currently, illegal fishing is within the mandate of the FAO’s IPOA-
IUU, as the principal international instrument, while transnational crime falls under the 
auspices of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDOC) and is regulated by a 
multilateral convention, the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime (UNCTOC).20   
1.4 IUU fishing a Regulatory Issue 
IUU fishing constitutes a threat to sustainable development by reducing the profitability for 
legitimate fishers. According to one Global Initiative Report on IUU fishing, treating IUU 
fishing as a regulatory issue, that is, as “different actors violating regulations”, fails to 
capture the true nature of the problem.21 The Report posits that there is evidence of 
systematic transnational violation of fishing laws, imparting to it the nature of a 
transnational organised crime. A notable problem and driver of IUU fishing is the misuse of 
flags of convenience which enable operators to choose and change a vessel’s registration, as 
there is no regulation or monitoring that keeps vessels bound to the registration of the 
country of origin.22 This makes it difficult to identify beneficial owners of vessels or to 
establish which states have jurisdiction over which vessels.  
                                                          
20        The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (2003) requires States Parties 
to criminalize, inter alia, participation in an organized group (article 5), the laundering of the proceeds 
of crime (article 6), and corruption (article 8). 
 
21   Generally, see Bondaroff (2015). 
 
22   Martini M ‘Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and corruption’ (2013) Transparency 
International 5 September 2013, available at 
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A case in point is that of the FV Viking, a stateless vessel that was sought by 13 nations for 
carrying out tooth-fish poaching in the Southern Ocean for over a decade. Indonesia 
eventually sank the ship. ‘The Viking was operating as a so-called ghost ship, frequently 
changing its name and registration and not broadcasting any type of satellite signal to 
establish its whereabouts.’23 What can be noted from this is how easily vessels operate 
transnationally, undetected, because states are either unwilling or unable to monitor and 
enforce existing regulations. The length of time taken to capture the Viking is evidence of 
both how ineffective state regulation on its own is and the gaps that exist in international 
law.  
Other than making it easy for transnational operations, flags of convenience further aid 
illegal activities such as transshipping – a form of ‘fish laundering’ where fish is transferred 
at sea by mixing legal and illegal fish, and then using vessels that carry cargo directly to a 
port of convenience where it is sold legally.24 The impact of IUU fishing is thus not only on 
the natural environmental, but also on economies of states and the livelihood of people.  
It bears noting that illegal fishing is within the mandate of the FAO, which adopted the IPOA-
IUU as the principal international instrument aimed at addressing the problem. The IPOA-
IUU has been endorsed by 110 countries so far. The IPOA-IUU, and several other 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
https://www.google.co.bw/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ah
UKEwjq1d3ujOLRAhVnCsAKHZ_fAsQQFggaMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.u4.no%2Fpublications%2
Fillegal-unreported-and-unregulated-fishing-and-
corruption%2Fdownloadasset%2F3261&usg=AFQjCNHj_M90f3KRkepzWF-UIm3i1jwQRQ  (accessed 
on 10 April 2016). 
 
23   Jatmiko A “Indonesian authorities bombed the last major ship internationally wanted for years of 
illegally taking tooth fish from southern waters, reiterating a strong message to would-be poachers 
who enter the country's waters” US News, available at 
http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2016-03-14/indonesia-blows-up-illegal-toothfish-ship-
sought-by-interpol  (accessed 14 April 2016). 
 
24       Martini (2013) 3. 
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instruments adopted to deal with IUU fishing, are soft law approaches, that is, they have no 
legally binding obligations on signatories. By contrast, the regulation of transnational crime 
under UNCTOC follows a hard law approach, creating legally binding obligations on 
signatories. Criminalisation of IUU fishing thus entails a resolution of how the different 
institutions can be co-ordinated, particularly in cases where there is a link to organised 
crime. For instance, in a case involving the trafficking of cocaine by a fishing vessel, the 
question that arises is how the different mandates of the relevant institutions and 
instruments will be brought into effect?  
Literature in the form of reports and issue papers argues that IUU fishing can no longer be 
regarded as a regulatory issue by attempting to establish a nexus between the illicit practice 
and transnational organised crime. Despite a systematic study exploring IUU fishing as a 
transnational organised crime, gaps remain in the actual legal conceptualisation of the 
crime. This is traceable to the existing international legal framework for marine resources, 
environmental law and transnational criminal law. 
1.5 Research Objectives 
This study seeks to determine whether the characterisation of IUU fishing as a transnational 
organised crime can help regulate fishing operations and have an effective global reach for 
curbing organised crime in this area, in the light of the vulnerabilities of the fishing industry. 
It further investigates whether the mandates of the different, relevant institutions and 
instruments can be integrated to curb IUU fishing as a transnational crime, particularly 
where IUU fishing is made a transnational organised crime. 
 
 
 
 
 
 10 
 
1.6 Research Questions 
The study seeks to answer two questions: 
➢ First, can the characterisation of IUU fishing as a transnational organised crime help 
to regulate fishing operations and have an effective global reach for curbing 
organised crime in this area? 
➢ Second, how can the mandates of the different, relevant institutions and 
instruments be integrated to curb IUU fishing as a transnational organised crime? 
1.7 Methodology 
This research paper will be a qualitative desk-study which will review both primary and 
secondary texts. The primary sources that will be consulted are international legal 
instruments, national laws, case law, UN reports, as well as reports by inter-governmental 
and governmental commissions. The secondary sources will consist mainly of journal 
articles, chapters in books and media reports. 
1.8 Scope of the Study 
The study analyses the existing regulatory frameworks of South Africa, Ghana, the European 
Union Regulation on Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (EU IUU Regulation), and 
the recently adopted African Union Lomé Charter. These regulatory frameworks and 
instruments will be compared, noting their similarities, differences, strengths and 
weaknesses. These countries and region are chosen because they are coastal countries and 
have also taken significant regulatory measures to address IUU fishing. They provide a good 
contrast of measures on the demand side and the supply side of IUU fishing, as well as the 
distinction in technical capacities. Nevertheless, they remain vulnerable to threats of 
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fisheries crime. To provide more clarity, the study further identifies the common conduct 
that is criminalised as part of IUU fishing. 
1.9 Outline of Remaining Chapters 
Chapter two will focus on illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing as a regulatory issue 
and analyse its existing national and international management framework. It will include a 
comparative study of Ghana, South Africa, the European Union’s National Plans of Action 
(NPOA) towards IUU fishing, and the Lomé Charter, to consider the lack of standardised 
governance and lax enforcement in the fishing industry. This is in furtherance of the 
contention that the current regulatory approach is ineffective and that there is need for 
more stringent means to curb this vice. 
Chapter 3 draws upon the nexus between IUU fishing and other organised crime. It 
expounds on the question of whether IUU fishing can and should be established as a 
transnational organised crime, what the legally protected interest may be, and how this 
could be reconciled with the role of other international regulatory institutions such as the 
FAO and UNODC. 
Chapter four discusses the conclusions to be drawn from the study and submits 
recommendations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 12 
 
Chapter Two 
Fisheries Legislative, Policy and Management Framework 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter One introduced the study by defining IUU fishing and explaining its extent. More 
importantly, it highlighted the increased global efforts being made to curb the vice, with a 
shift in the perception of it as merely a fisheries management problem. The chapter 
provided evidence of IUU fishing as a transnational organised crime (TOC), emphasising the 
emergent problem of fisheries crime, and justified the need to standardise transnational 
criminalisation as a supplement to existing efforts. 
This chapter explores this possibility by investigating current responses to IUU fishing 
internationally and domestically. The national legal frameworks of South Africa and Ghana, 
as well as the regional instruments, The European Union Regulation on IUU Fishing and the 
Lomé Charter, which have been selected are analysed. Through comparative analysis, gaps 
in the current position are identified as well as policies and measures proposed to address 
these gaps. Essentially, Chapter Two attempts to provide evidence of deficiencies in the 
existing fisheries management and conservation paradigm, internationally and domestically. 
It includes an analysis of how effective responses to IUU fishing have been so far, and 
highlights the prevalent challenges.  
2.2 International Legal Framework 
Effective conservation and management of marine living resources has been on the global 
agenda for over three decades. A myriad of instruments and frameworks, ranging from 
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those that are binding to voluntary measures, have been adopted over the years to address 
fisheries management problems, both on the high seas and within national waters. The 
instruments and conventions summarily discussed below address the need to achieve 
responsible fishing by improving flag state compliance. They evidently illustrate that the call 
for global co-operation among states and organisations has been a recurring theme 
throughout the fisheries management discourse. 
2.2.1 The United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea (1982) 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter referred to as UNCLOS)25 
emanates from a United Nations General Assembly resolution which declared that ‘the area 
of the seabed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction, as well as its resources, are the common heritage of mankind, the exploration 
and exploitation of which shall be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole, 
irrespective of the geographical location of states’.26  
UNCLOS is a binding international instrument that establishes the sovereign rights of coastal 
states to exploit, conserve and manage marine living resources within their jurisdiction. It is 
the first attempt at codifying the law of the sea, therefore, generally accepted as the basic 
legal order for the seas and oceans. UNCLOS is instrumental in facilitating efficient and 
equitable conservation and management of the seas and ocean resources. It addresses the 
balancing of rights and interests to access marine living resources, and the conservation of 
the marine environment. The role of flag states in enforcing maritime protection provisions 
is emphasised under the Convention. Its most significant innovation is the Exclusive 
                                                          
25  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, adopted on 10 December 1982 and entered into 
force on 14 November 1994. 
 
26  Preamble to UNCLOS. 
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Economic Zone (EEZ), standardised as ‘200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the 
breadth of the territorial sea is measured’,27 which gives coastal states exclusive jurisdiction 
and exclusive rights to the resources in its EEZ. This, however, has accompanying 
responsibilities and obligations regarding their use and exploitation, such as determining the 
total allowable catch.28  
UNCLOS has contributed to the discourse on conservation and management of marine living 
resources, which is essential to curbing IUU fishing by setting out clear objectives on their 
use and preservation. These objectives, however, lack specific guidelines on how to achieve 
them. Nonetheless, they have been the bedrock upon which further policies and initiatives 
to conserve and manage marine resources have been formulated. 
2.2.2 The FAO Compliance Agreement (1993) 
The FAO Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and 
Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, or the Compliance Agreement, 
was adopted at the FAO conference in November 1993.29 It was developed in order to 
ensure that states comply with UNCLOS obligations by taking all measures necessary to 
conserve and manage the high seas, and it applies ‘to all fishing vessels that are used or 
intended for fishing on the high seas’.30 It is significant as the first international legally 
                                                          
27  Article 57 of UNCLOS. 
 
28  Kwadjosse T ‘The Law of the Sea: Impacts on the Conservation and Management of Fisheries Resources 
of Developing Coastal States – The Ghana Case Study’ (2009) The United Nations 9. 
 
29  The FAO Compliance Agreement of 1993, adopted on 23 April 2003 and entered into force in November 
2003. 
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binding instrument to  address solely flag state compliance and responsibility.31 It reinforces 
particularly the duty imposed on flag states to regulate fishing vessels on the high seas by 
addressing the practice of reflagging,32 and qualifies the right of flag states to exercise 
jurisdiction and control over their flag vessels. Unlike UNCLOS, the Compliance Agreement 
provides some guidelines on how the high seas can better be regulated. Article 4 of the 
Agreement, for example, requires states parties to maintain a record of fishing vessels 
entitled to fly their flag and authorised for use on the high seas. The obligation to co-
operate in the implementation of the Agreement is augmented under article 5. Bilateral, 
regional and multi-organisational co-operation is encouraged, as well as the provision of 
technical assistance to meet obligations of the Agreement.33 Nevertheless, it has failed to 
gain widespread acceptance among states.34 
2.2.3 The UN Fish Stocks Agreement (1995) 
The UN Fish Stocks Agreement35 was enforced in 2001 as a measure to strengthen the legal 
framework for the conservation and management of straddling and highly migratory fish 
stocks. It complements the FAO Compliance Agreement in facilitating the implementation of 
UNCLOS provisions, but focuses on conservation and management of straddling and highly 
migratory fish stocks. In practice, the occurrence of straddling stock in both the EEZ and the 
                                                          
31  Rigg K ‘Halting IUU Fishing: Enforcing International Fisheries Agreements’ (2003), available at 
http://www.imcsnet.org/imcs/docs/halting_iuu_fishing_oceana.pdf (accessed 15 May 2016). 
 
32  Reflagging is practised when ships change their national registration, thereby obscuring their identity   
and avoiding compliance with conservation regulations for fishing activities on the high seas.  
 
33  Art 7. 
 
34  Rigg K (2003).  
 
35  Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks 
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks. 
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high seas has significant transboundary effects for fisheries management.36 As such, the Fish 
Stocks Agreement establishes a list of general principles of conservation and management 
under article 5. Notably, it introduces precautionary and ecosystem system approaches, 
expressly required in fisheries management.37 It requires compatibility in conservation and 
management measures adopted for EEZs and for the high seas.  Regional fisheries 
management organisations (RFMOs) are thus used as the primary vehicles to enhance co-
operation among coastal states and the regulation of high seas fishing stocks. The 
Agreement incorporates principles established in UNCLOS, such as co-operation in fisheries 
conservation and management, strengthening them further with new implementation 
norms. It further contains provisions that break new ground. However, its ambit is focused 
on straddling and highly migratory fish stocks.  
2.2.4 The FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (1995) 
The Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, though voluntary in nature, was 
unanimously adopted by the 1995 FAO Conference. It is global and broad in application, 
extending to every stage and process of fisheries production as well as market-related 
measures. It sets out a framework for international and national standards of behaviour for 
sustainable exploitation, conservation, management and development of aquatic living 
resources. The system of monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) is given importance 
under the Code. As will be noted below under the discussion of national frameworks, this 
                                                          
36  United Nations ‘DOALOS/UNITAR Briefing on Developments in Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea 20 
years After the Conclusion of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’ (2002) United 
Nations available at 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_20years/1995FishStockAgreement_
ATahindro.pdf (accessed 14 April 2016). 
 
37  Arts 5(c) and 6. 
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system is the leading approach to fisheries management.  The 1996 FAO Technical 
Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries No.138 provides technical guidelines for the 
implementation of the Code. 
2.2.5 The IPOA-IUU (2001) 
Combatting IUU fishing has been a topic of discussion in a number of international fora since 
the late 1990s.39 However, It only became a matter of high priority and serious concern in 
1999, following information presented to the FAO Committee on Fisheries (COFI) about 
fishing vessels flying ‘flags of convenience’ and the threat this poses  to achieving 
sustainable fisheries.40 In the light of this phenomenon, the International Plan of Action to 
Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU) was 
adopted in 2001 as a global plan of action. It was conceived within the framework of the 
Code of Conduct as a comprehensive toolbox with a diverse set of measures to guide states 
in the fight against IUU fishing problems.41 It outlines the responsibilities of states in detail, 
including measures tailored for flag, coastal and port states. Actions under the IPOA-IUU are 
divided into eight categories: All State Responsibilities; Flag State Responsibilities; Coastal 
State Measures; Market-related Measures; Research; Regional Fisheries Management 
Organisations (RFMOs); and Special Requirements of Developing Countries. Under the 
                                                          
38  Baird (2006) 85. 
 
39  IPOA-IUU Introduction. 
 
40  Article 1(1) of the IPOA-IUU. 
 
41  House of Ocean ‘IUU: Is it a bird or a plane? Is it illegal fishing, unregulated fishing or crime? Look to   
the Fish Stocks Agreement for answers’ (2015), available at  
http://iuufishing.ideasoneurope.eu/2015/10/04/iuu-bird-plane-illegal-fishing-unregulated-fishing-
crime-look-fish-stocks-agreement-answers/ (accessed on 15 May 2016).  
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objectives and principles of the IPOA-IUU, the role of RFMOs in curbing IUU fishing through 
effective and transparent measures is emphasised.42 
The IPOA-IUU defines the nature and scope of the distinct, though overlapping components 
of illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, elaborated in the preceding chapter of this 
study. This definition has been incorporated into treaties, national legislation and European 
legislation. This is problematic because the definition lacks legal clarity: ‘the IPOA-IUU does 
not specify which measures address illegal fishing, unreported fishing, or unregulated 
fishing,’ but rather generically addresses IUU fishing.43 The nexus between the nature and 
scope of IUU fishing and the implementation measures to combat it is thus obscured. 
Because of this ambiguity, Palma notes that states fail to examine how the international 
definition of IUU fishing applies within a national context, especially where IPOA-IUU 
measures are implemented under National Plans of Action (NPOAs).44 This may be evident 
under the discussion of specific national measures and contexts later in the chapter.  
Despite its shortcomings, the IPOA-IUU is key to preventing, deterring, and eliminating IUU 
fishing. The FAO has the primary mandate to promote its implementation at regional and 
national level through a comprehensive and integrated approach.45 It bears noting that the 
success of the IPOA-IUU in fulfilling its objectives is dependent on state implementation and 
effective use of the tools available. The chapter later investigates the legal and institutional 
frameworks of Ghana, South Africa and the European Union. 
                                                          
42  Art 3(8) of the IPOA-IUU.  
 
43  Palma MA ‘Combatting IUU Fishing: International Legal Developments’ in Hanich Q & Tsamenyi M  
(eds) Navigating Pacific Fisheries: Legal and Policy Trends in the Implementation of International 
Fisheries Instruments on the Western and Central Pacific Region (2009) 74. 
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2.2.6 Port State Measures Agreement (2009) 
The Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported, and 
Unregulated Fishing (Port State Measures Agreement) is the first legally binding instrument 
addressing IUU fishing. The UN FAO Conference adopted the Agreement in 2009, but it only 
came into force mid-2016 after 30 ratifications. Though the threshold of 25 ratifications was 
exceeded, the 30 states are only a small fraction of Port States, and the delay in ratifications 
is concerning as it may be an indication of state reluctance to enforce the Agreement. 
Notwithstanding this apparent reluctance, the Agreement is a necessary addition to the 
global fisheries management conversation as it standardises Port State measures by setting 
out minimum requirements for their use by foreign vessels.  
Port States are required to designate and publicise specific ports to which foreign vessels 
may request entry.46 Prior application for entry ought to be made, and a Port State will 
decide whether to grant entry, considering specified measures, such as the vessel’s 
engagement in IUU fishing.47 Illegality in the Agreement is restricted to IUU fishing and 
related activity, without specification of what this ‘related activity’ may be.  One could argue 
that where organised crime is committed, it could fall under the auspices of the Agreement 
if there is a nexus with IUU fishing operations. This, however, remains open to 
interpretation. Article 11 requires Port States to restrict the use of their ports for ‘landing, 
transshipping, packaging and processing of fish’. A reasonable suspicion of a vessel’s 
engagement in or support of IUU fishing and related activities suffices as grounds for such 
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restriction, thus, negating the need for actual knowledge.48 Prior to this provision, Port 
States could allow vessels to land and process illegal fish through their ports, only to 
discover that some vessels had been complicit in IUU fishing or related activity. Article 11 
eliminates time lags of investigation and obtaining actual knowledge before Port States can 
act against vessels.  
Essentially, the general idea is to make it difficult for IUU fishing operators to circumvent 
laws, by ensuring uniformity in regulation. To this end, the Agreement requires states to co-
operate and exchange information.49 The role of flag states is reiterated, especially the duty 
to investigate and enforce action against their vessels.50 Nevertheless, the Agreement places 
no obligation on Port States to investigate or take enforcement action against foreign 
vessels seeking entry that are known, or reasonably suspected of having engaged in, or 
supported IUU fishing. This forms grounds to deny entry awaiting flag state action. 
Ultimately, the likely effect is that IUU fishing operators will have more incentive to make 
use of ports of convenience, further deterring detection of illegal activity. Criminal 
enterprises logically pursue flags of convenience due to lax law enforcement. The 
Agreement falls short of addressing and resolving the issue of flags and ports of 
convenience, despite standardising port State measures. Until these measures are widely 
implemented, and the reality of organised crime is included in the fisheries management 
discourse, a lacuna exists. 
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2.3 National Legislative, Policy and Management Frameworks 
2.3.1 Ghana 
The Republic of Ghana is a developing coastal state situated along the Gulf of Guinea, 
bordering the Atlantic Ocean, with a coastline measuring about 550 km in extent.51 The 
Ghanaian fisheries sector accounts for at least 4.5 per cent of the national GDP and for the 
employment of about 10 per cent of the population who work in the marine, inland and 
lagoon environments and who also benefit  from aquaculture.52 Fish accounts for an 
estimated 60 per cent of animal protein in the Ghanaian diet.53 However, like most coastal 
and port states, the fisheries sector is vulnerable to illegal, unreported and unregulated 
fishing activities, as well as organised crime. Ghana is said to lose about US$100 million 
annually in catches.54 West African countries, Ghana inclusive, serve as supply and transit 
zones and destination countries for what can collectively be classified as fisheries crime.55  
2.3.1.1    Historical development 
The significance of the fisheries sector in Ghana can be traced as far back as the 1800s and 
1900s when fishing was mainly a subsistence activity, with the commercial sector emerging 
later, as demand for fish increased.56 Until the 1970s, fishing activity was restricted to 
                                                          
51  National Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing  
(2014) 9. 
 
52  NPOA-IUU (2014) 10. 
 
53  Nunoo F, Asiedu B, Amador K, Belhabhb K, Lam V, Sumaila R & Pauly D ‘Marine Fisheries Catches in  
Ghana: Historic Reconstruction for 1950 to 2010 and Current Economic Impacts‘ Reviews in Fisheries 
Science & Aquaculture (2014) 22 274. 
 
54  Bondaroff (2015) 48. 
 
55  Bondaroff (2015) 49. 
 
56  Kwadjosse (2009) 12. 
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inshore waters. A surge of investment into the fisheries sector prompted expansion of 
commercial fishing activities, venturing into offshore waters in the 1970s and 1980s. 
However, despite the expanding fisheries sector, Ghana still lacked a comprehensive 
regulatory framework to manage investment and conserve marine resources. 
Mismanagement of investments and political instability in the 1970s and 1980s, among 
other reasons, unfortunately led to the collapse of the industry.57 Following the adoption of 
UNCLOS in 1982 and the subsequent declaration of EEZs by states, Ghanaian fishing vessels 
were shut out from offshore waters and had to return to inland waters.58 Inshore marine 
resources were overexploited by the 1990s, which led to a continued decline of the Ghana 
fishing industry and need for reconstruction.59 
Ghana ratified UNCLOS in 1983. The Convention is not only a significant milestone for 
international fisheries law, but also a source of various important instruments for fisheries 
management in Ghana. Kwadjosse states that prior to UNCLOS, fisheries legislation ‘focused 
on building and importation of fishing craft and manning of the craft’60 as opposed to 
effective conservation of fisheries resources. The tide changed in 1991 with the Provisional 
National Defence Council (PNDC) Law61 which had management and conservation of fishery 
resources as its primary objective, establishing licensing measures and Monitoring Control 
and Surveillance (MCS).62 After the PNDC Law was enacted the Fisheries Commission was 
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58  Nunoo (2015) 274. 
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60  For example, the Wholesale Fish Marketing Act of 1963. 
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established. It was tasked with regulating, managing fishery resources and co-ordinating 
policy using an array of administrative powers under the Fisheries Commission Act.63   
The Fisheries Act of 200264 reaffirmed the importance of the Fisheries Commission, as it 
became the mainstay of Ghanaian fisheries management effort. More significantly, the Act 
establishes a Monitoring, Control, and Surveillance (MCS) division65 with an Enforcement 
Unit.66 The Minister is allowed in terms of the Act to request assistance and support from 
personnel in other departments and competent bodies that have police powers to assist the 
Enforcement Unit.67 This was a vital development, indicative of acknowledgement of the 
need for enforcement within the Ghanaian fisheries management framework. This perhaps 
stems from the IPOA-IUU which was adopted a year before the Fisheries Act and which 
urges states to encourage multi-stakeholder involvement ‘including industry, fishing 
communities and non-governmental organizations’.68 Nonetheless, the powers entrusted to 
the Enforcement Unit relate to monitoring, control and surveillance.69 The Act, however, 
entrusts authorised officers with the power of arrest, search and seizure, which are 
important for facilitating the prosecution of offenders.70 The appointment of such 
authorised officers is, unfortunately, a voluntary exercise.71 This may suggest that Ghanaian 
                                                          
63  Fisheries Commission Act 457 of 1993. 
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fisheries management prioritises conservation as opposed to building a case for successful 
prosecution of IUU fishing cases and related parallel activity. 
Notwithstanding these shortcomings, the Fisheries Act is an attempt to integrate 
international fisheries agreements into the Ghanaian domestic framework. The IPOA-IUU 
obligates member states to adopt national plans of action as the primary vehicle for 
implementing the IPOA-IUU domestically. The aim of the domestic implementation is to 
target specifically prevention, detection and deterrence of IUU fishing.72 Ghana is one of the 
few countries that has adopted a national plan of action to prevent, deter and eliminate 
illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing (NPOA-IUU). 
2.3.1.2   NPOA-IUU 
The Ghanaian NPOA-IUU is meant to fight illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, using 
the IPOA-IUU as a template. It gives a profile of Ghana’s fisheries, identifying the gaps in its 
fisheries management practice, and gives a synopsis of IUU fishing in the Ghanaian context, 
recognising that the IPOA-IUU is not a one-size-fits-all approach. It is thus a toolbox to 
address IUU fishing, providing national responses that are tailor-suited to address Ghanaian 
gaps in fisheries management. For example, it focuses more on detection and action against 
foreign vessels, addressing the historical challenge of “border hopping” into Ghanaian 
waters by foreign vessels.73  
The NPOA-IUU adopts the IPOA-IUU definition of IUU fishing, and its action responses are 
based on the IPOA-IUU. It unfortunately also inherits the challenge and shortcomings of the 
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IPOA-IUU by addressing IUU fishing only generically. The actions to combat IUU fishing are 
divided into eight categories as per the IPOA-IUU, namely: All State Responsibilities; Flag 
State Responsibilities; Coastal State Measures; Port State Measures; Market-related 
Measures; Research; Regional Fisheries Management Organisations and Special 
requirements of developing countries.74 These responses are blanket responses to IUU 
fishing and are not tailored to addressing the various components. Moreover, there are no 
national implementation guidelines. As an illustration, action 9 under Flag State 
Responsibilities requires Ghana to ‘enforce relevant fisheries regulations for Ghana-flagged 
vessels on the high seas and in the jurisdiction of other States.’75 Action 9, however, 
neglects to state which fisheries regulations are of relevance and what the enabling 
legislation of this action is. The NPOA-IUU fails to include issues not addressed by the IPOA-
IUU, such as the presence of organised crime in the fishing industry.  
2.3.2 South Africa 
South Africa’s coastline is more than 3200 km long, stretching from the coral reefs of 
Northern KwaZulu Natal to the Northern Cape. The coastal waters contain approximately 
10 000 species of marine plants and animals.76 According to the Annual Report of the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries, the South African fisheries sector 
contributes about 0.1 per cent of the nation’s gross domestic product (GDP), with a total 
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output estimated at approximately R6 billion.77 The Industry Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fisheries in South Africa, however, provides a different estimation, stating that 
the ‘commercial fishing industry contributes about 0.5 per cent of the GDP with an annual 
turnover of approximately R80 billion’.78  This disparity suggests that reported catches have 
either dropped drastically in the last two years, or that available records are inconsistent 
and/or inaccurate.  
Although the fisheries sector’s contribution to GDP is proportionally smaller than that of 
Ghana, the contribution of the fisheries sector to economic output, skills development and 
employment through commercial, subsistence and recreational fishing cannot be 
overlooked.79 It accounts for an estimated 108 000 jobs directly and indirectly.80 Due 
consideration ought to be given to the fact that output is determined by the health and 
management of stocks, which in turn influence catch volumes.81 Current output is, however, 
limited due to overexploitation of fish stocks through IUU fishing activities, particularly 
inshore species.82  South African fisheries management is thus premised on administration 
of ‘fishing rights, permits, exemptions and licences’.83  
 
                                                          
77  Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries Annual Report – Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries  
(2016) 32. 
 
78  Industry Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries in South Africa (2014) 4. 
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2.3.2.1.1 Historical Development of Fisheries Management  
Fisheries conservation and management efforts in South Africa date as far back as the 
1890s.84 The 1960s were characterised by a considerable presence of foreign vessel 
activities in South African national waters, a phenomenon that resulted in unfettered 
profiteering from marine resources. This unchecked fishing activity resulted in the collapse 
of fish stocks in the 1970s.85 The government declared a 200-nautical mile fishing zone limit 
in 1977, and enacted the Territorial Waters Act in response to the collapse of the fishing 
industry.86 These were initial steps towards regulation of fish stocks and protection from 
severe international fishing expeditions.87 Nevertheless, stocks continued to decline in the 
1970s and 1980s despite the limited presence of foreign fleets accessing South African 
waters.88 This prompted the introduction of Total Allowable Catch (TAC) and Total Allowable 
Effort (TAE) restrictions, used individually or jointly in commercial fisheries.89 These are 
presently used in the fisheries management efforts. 
Prior to 1994, the fisheries industry was dominated by white-owned companies, while most 
black South Africans were denied access to marine resources, due to racially exclusionary 
laws and policies of the apartheid system that focused on the growing commercial fisheries 
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trade.90 Unlike in Ghana, small-scale fishers were initially not recognised legally as 
participants in fishing activity, with many dispossessed of their land adjacent to the coast.91 
Following the new democratic dispensation of 1994, and based on the values enshrined in 
the Constitution, the challenge was to establish fishing equity. A shift in fisheries policy 
sought to reallocate fishing quotas in an equitable way, ensuring that historically 
disadvantaged individuals (HDIs) can also participate in the industry.92  
The Marine Living Resources Act93 was passed in 1998. It has become the fundamental 
regulatory framework for fishing in South Africa. It provides redress and recognises the 
rights of small-scale fishers under section 19. Notwithstanding this development, the 
expectation of increased efforts to augment access to marine resources between 1994 and 
2000 resulted in a “rush” for fishing rights.94 This created a need for a revised strategy on 
how to achieve fishing equity in a rational and transparent manner. In 2001, investment and 
experience in the fishing industry, black economic empowerment and employment equity 
were identified as key criteria for the allocation of fishing rights.95 Opening access of marine 
resources to many more players was not without its side effects, for it strained the fisheries 
administration and resulted in  a surge of new threats to resource sustainability.96 A case in 
point is the extensive poaching of abalone and non-reporting of catches that assumed 
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threatening proportions, necessitating a more robust compliance system.97 An 
environmental court was set up in the coastal town of Hermanus in the Western Cape to 
prosecute primarily abalone poachers.98 
The Hermanus Environmental Court was established in 2003 as the first South African 
specialised environmental crimes court.  Unfortunately, its operation was short-lived. It was 
closed in 2006 following a political decision to shut down specialised courts that lacked a 
legislative mandate.99  Despite its fleeting existence, a discussion of the court is imperative 
for this study, as it provides useful lessons for criminalisation and prosecution of illegal 
fishing offences. The court boasted a 70% success rate. A total of 74 cases were heard in its 
first year of existence. Apart from poachers, other key players in the fisheries chain such as 
transporters and processors were prosecuted as well.100 Lessons to be learnt from the court 
include: prioritised attention to environmental cases; multi-stakeholder collaboration; 
combining resources and expertise; use of prison penalties as opposed to fines which are 
easily considered as costs of doing business; and developing appropriate structures for 
forfeiture of assets to prevent furthering criminal interests.101 These lessons will be 
discussed further in the following Chapter in the context of transnational criminalisation. 
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2.3.2.1.2 Fisheries Management Framework 
‘Fisheries policy is founded on two fundamental principles, namely, that fisheries resources 
belong to all of South Africa’s people and that these resources should be utilised on a 
sustainable basis so that both present and future generations may benefit from them.’102 
The South African fisheries management dispensation is largely premised on the UNCLOS 
approach – by way of Total Allowable Catch quotas for single species and access rights 
assigned to individual fishers.103 Fishing rights are granted on the basis that rights holders 
abide by a code of conduct which obligates them to fish responsibly and to adhere to the 
laws and regulations.104  
The Marine Living Resources Act105 and its regulations provide the core basis of fisheries 
management in South Africa. The prevalent management system treats violations of the Act 
as administrative law matters. The idea is  to encourage compliance through increased 
monitoring, surveillance and control of vessel activities.106 Six primary types of management 
controls are used: restricting the number of vessels or individuals through TACs and TAE;107 
seasonal closures, marine protected areas;108 gear size restrictions and gear mesh size 
restrictions.109 The MLRA criminalises contravention of almost all its provisions,110 and 
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dedicates an entire chapter to law enforcement.111 Section 9 of the Act entrusts Fisheries 
Control Officers with the duties of peace officers, granting them extensive powers to 
enforce compliance.112 They are empowered to enter and search any vessel, to seize 
property and arrest persons on any reasonable grounds.113 The challenge, however, is that 
the provision empowering their appointment is hortatory, as is the case with Ghanaian 
authorised officers, suggesting that enforcement is inconsistent and lax. It further supports 
the view that the current dispensation prioritises and focuses more on fisheries regulation 
through conservation efforts for maintaining optimal levels, as opposed to detection of 
parallel activity on fishing vessels and in the industry. In addition, the effect on deterrence is 
negligible because sanctions imposed are minimal: the heftiest fine payable in terms of 
section 58 of the Act is five million rand and the longest prison sentence is five years.  
One of the notable findings from studies investigating the nexus between IUU fishing and 
organised crime is the distinction in institutions under whose mandate they are and 
different legislative instruments governing them. The same holds true in the South African 
context – fisheries management is under the auspices of the Department of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF), while organised crime falls under the South African Police 
Service (SAPS) with the Prevention of Organised Crime (POCA) as the primary legislative 
instrument.114 De Coning refers to the Bengis case115 as an illustration of the need for co-
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ordinated efforts between multiple, relevant agencies in order to tackle both IUU fishing 
and organised crime successfully.116 The practical implications of this case are discussed in 
the following chapter. 
 
2.4 Regional Legal Framework 
2.4.1 EU IUU Regulation 
The European Union Regulation on Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (EU IUU 
Regulation)117 is a unilateral, regional measure that aims to prevent, deter, and eliminate 
the entry of IUU fishery products into the European Union market and international 
waters.118 ‘The European Union which is, inter alia, a customs union, is composed of 28 
member states which apply the same rules governing imports.’119 The EU Regulation 
endorses the FAO’s IPOA-IUU and its definition of IUU Fishing. 120 It, however, supplements 
this general definition with an ostensive definition, that is, by way of listing conduct that is 
to be presumed as IUU fishing.121 For instance, ‘fishing without a valid license, authorisation 
or permit issued by the flag State or the relevant coastal State’ constitutes IUU fishing.122 
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This approach gives the definition clarity, fulfilling the legality aspect of criminal liability as it 
makes clear what conduct exactly is prohibited and liable to sanction.  Using market-related 
measures, the EU Regulation aspires to thwart entry of IUU fishing products so that the 
economic incentive for IUU fishing is abated.123  To achieve this outcome, the Regulation 
employs three core components: a catch certification scheme, a third-country carding 
process, and penalties for EU nationals.124  
The choice of these measures comes against the backdrop of the EU as the world’s largest 
importer of fishery products and because the EU states lend their flags to vessels operating  
in distant waters under the Fishing Authorisation Regulation.125 The latter Regulation 
enables EU flagged vessels to operate in non-EU waters by way of agreements between the 
EU and third countries; or through direct private and charter agreements between private 
EU companies/citizens and authorities/companies in coastal countries.126 This arrangement, 
particularly the use of charter agreements, creates room for the obscurity of beneficial 
ownership of vessels, enabling re-flagging of vessels and subsequently allowing IUU fishing 
and parallel activities to flourish undetected. The current Fishing Authorisation Regulation 
has been criticised for not requiring vessels that operate outside official EU agreements to 
comply with fisheries management standards contained in these agreements.127 It follows 
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that, while the EU Regulation is progressive, it is not without its shortcomings, as will 
become apparent below. 
2.4.2 The EU Regulation Measures 
2.4.2.1.1 Catch Certification Scheme 
Article 12 of the Regulation is the enabling provision for the use of a certification scheme 
that ensures the prohibition of trade in IUU fishery products. Catch certification scheme 
measures aim to provide assurance that a vessel’s catches were made in accordance with 
applicable conservation and management rules, as validated by a competent authority of 
the flag state of the vessel.128 ‘The validated catch certificate shall be submitted by the 
importer to the competent authorities of the Member State in which the product is 
intended to be imported at least three working days before the estimated time of arrival at 
the place of entry into the territory of the Community’,129 the deadline being adaptable. 
Verification of catch certificates is done on a risk-based approach with respect to imports 
that face the greatest risk of being IUU fishing products.130 This is a loophole for organised 
crime syndicates as shipments of imports perceived as being less at risk of IUU fishing 
activity could be used to transport contraband and to facilitate   trade misinvoicing 
practices. The use of a paper-based system for certificates further hinders the effectiveness 
of verification, detection of illegal catches, and monitoring, a challenge that has been 
countered by a few member states that have developed an electronic system.131 The paper-
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based system also creates opportunities to perpetrate document fraud. To illustrate the 
practicality of these challenges, let us consider the following scenario: 132  
‘Country X issues a catch certificate for 200 tonnes of tuna destined for the EU, with a 
unique reference number MX234. The batch is split into three to go to three different EU 
countries. 100 tonnes are sent to France, 50 tonnes to Italy, and 50 tonnes to Portugal. All 
three batches carry the same CC MX234 (the original and two photocopies), which states 
that each batch is 200 tonnes. This means it is possible for each batch to be ‘topped up’ to 
200 tonnes: part original legally caught tuna, and part illegally caught tuna: 100+150 +150 
(400) illegal. As countries have no centralised means of comparing their CCs, the illegal 
portion of each consignment goes undetected.’ 
 
The above example not only shows the loopholes of the paper-based system of catch 
certification but further indicates that the system focuses on verification of legitimacy of 
catches, but omits possible detection of parallel activity. Considering the impossibility of 
verifying the accuracy of the information on each certificate, it is possible that the batch 
‘top-up’ may not be fish products per se but contraband such as drugs, and allows for 
laundering of illegal fish. Trade-based money laundering techniques could be used to 
transfer value of the excess illegitimate 400 tonnes, but with an appearance of legitimacy. 
These challenges undermine the effectiveness of the EU IUU Regulation and need to be 
addressed. 
2.4.2.1.2 Third-Country Carding Process 
‘A third country may be identified as a non-co-operating third country if it fails to discharge 
the duties incumbent upon it under international law as flag, port, coastal or market State, 
and if it fails to take action to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing.’133 This component 
of the EU Regulation is a process. Initially, the Commission examines the measures taken by 
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a ‘third country’ to curb IUU fishing against a list of set, but non-exhaustive criteria.134 
Where the country is found to have inadequate measures in place, or is not co-operating, 
the Commission may issue a yellow card, as a formal warning of pre-identification.135 There 
is room for dialogue at this point between the Commission and the relevant country’s 
authorities concerning resolution of compliance issues.136 A red card is issued in the event 
that the country does not carry out reforms, resulting in a ban of trade in fisheries between 
the red carded country and EU countries.137   Pursuant to article 34, both yellow and red 
cards may be lifted and a country removed from the list of non-cooperating third countries 
if ‘the situation that warranted its listing has been rectified’. Ghana was yellow-carded in 
November 2013 due to inadequate measures to curb IUU fishing. It was delisted in 2015 
after taking several steps to strengthen its fisheries management and legal framework.138 
This highlights the impact of ‘peer-pressure’ in eliciting responsible action. Unfortunately, 
having adequate measures is one thing, and effectively using them for their intended 
purpose is another. The notion that success cannot be imported holds true, particularly in 
the absence of political will. 
2.4.2.1.3 Penalties for EU Nationals and Operators 
Article 39 of the EU Regulation prohibits nationals of EU Member States from supporting or 
engaging in IUU fishing. Punitive measures can be taken against national legal and juristic 
persons in the form of ‘a maximum sanction of at least five times the value of the fishery 
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products obtained through committing the offence, and eight times the value of the fishery 
products in case of a repeated infringement within a five-year period’.139 These sanctions, 
compared to the pre-determined amounts provided under the Ghanaian and South African 
legal framework are effective, proportionate and dissuasive, to the extent that they account 
for the value of fishery products, thereby depriving the offender of the economic incentive 
of IUU fishing. Such action is ‘without prejudice to the primary responsibility of the flag 
State’.140  
2.4.3 The Lomé Charter (2016) 
The African Charter on Maritime Security and Safety and Development in Africa (Lomé 
Charter)141 was adopted by the Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union in Lomé, 
Togo, on 15 October 2016. It aims to ‘prevent and suppress national and transnational 
crime’,142 and, to ‘promote a flourishing and sustainable blue economy’,143 among others. 
38 of 54 AU member countries are coastal or island states, with over 90 per cent of Africa’s 
exports and imports being transported by sea.144 The adoption of the Charter thus indicates 
the primacy of maritime security, safety and development on the African agenda. The 
Charter is, however, yet to come into force after 15 ratifications.145  
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Like several other regional and national instruments, the Lomé Charter adopts the IPOA-IUU 
definition of IUU fishing. Arguably, the Charter is more of an instrument advancing the 
agenda of sustainable development and optimal use of the blue economy, than it is an 
instrument to address IUU fishing. It has no chapter or provision dedicated to IUU fishing, 
but rather takes a holistic view towards all transnational organised crime at sea. It 
recognises the prevalence of transnational organised crime at sea, but unfortunately 
provides broad means to curb these. Chapter two of the Charter proposes a myriad of 
measures to combat crime at sea, including socio-economic measures, establishing national 
co-ordinating structures, and use of law enforcement to prosecute perpetrators. States 
parties ought to ensure that perpetrators are denied advantages of the proceeds of their 
crimes.146 By implication, fisheries crime, especially IUU fishing, ought to be perceived and 
addressed as an enterprise crime that threatens the development of the blue economy. 
Notwithstanding its shortcomings, the Lomé Charter has made serious inroads as the first 
treaty to recognise IUU fishing as a transnational organised crime, 147 and is in many 
respects progressive. Although it makes no mention of flag and port state responsibility, it 
requires co-operation of flag and coastal states, sharing financial obligations of security and 
safety in the spirit of co-responsibility.148 This is a significant addition to the fisheries crime 
discourse, as the transboundary nature of the vice requires different actors concerned to 
share the burden and responsibility, rather than solely giving flag states such an onerous 
task. Further, the lack of monitoring mechanisms and accountability for addressing 
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transnational organised crime have been a significant gap. The Charter attempts to rectify 
this by establishing a 15-member Committee of states parties responsible for monitoring its 
implementation and recommend follow-up actions.149 States parties are required to submit 
to the Committee ‘a report on the measures that they have undertaken to give effect to the 
provisions of the Charter’.150 In turn, the Committee ought to present a report on the 
progress made in implementing the Charter to the Assembly bi-annually.151 Effectively, a 
system of accountability is created, which is imperative not only regionally but 
internationally as well. 
The Charter confers dispute resolution authority on a non-existent court, the African Court 
of Justice and Human and People’s Rights.152 The latter reflects African leaders’ tendency to 
adopt theoretically sound or progressive treaties and protocols, but not to give effect to 
them once the initial political will is extinguished. It follows that the Lomé Charter is not 
merely fine print, but could have significant bearing on enforcing regional responsibility and 
action for curbing fisheries crime. 
2.4.4 Chapter Conclusion 
Measures to address IUU fishing have so far been ineffective due to lax enforcement and 
disparate implementation. The pitfalls of the IPOA-IUU as the primary instrument, notably, 
the elusive legal definition of IUU fishing, among others, have been inherited and 
transposed into domestic legal frameworks. At national level, historical challenges of states 
inform the fisheries management discourse and subsequent resource allocation. Ghana, for 
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example, is primarily concerned with restricting foreign vessel entry into national waters, 
while South Africa is fixated on undoing the apartheid legacy through equitable allocation of 
fishing rights. The EU Regulation aims to correct demand side deficiencies through market-
related measures. This distinction is not quite the issue, as is the lack of co-ordination of 
efforts and the need to find common ground to address similar threats.  
The reality of organised crime in the fisheries sector had for a long time not been 
acknowledged or addressed in leading international fisheries management instruments. 
However, the Lomé Charter departs from this trend by being the first treaty to acknowledge 
IUU fishing as a transnational organised crime. It, however, provides no guidance on how 
IUU fishing fits into the broader, existing legal dispensation as a transnational organised 
crime. Domestically, IUU fishing has been criminalised in several states. The consensus is 
that criminalisation has not achieved its desired effects due to lack of technical capacity and 
resources, particularly in third world countries. Some of these challenges are addressed in 
the next chapter. Notwithstanding this, major pitfalls both at domestic, regional, and 
international level are lack of political will and varying levels of commitment. While it is 
imperative to explore IUU fishing as a transnational organised crime, it is worth noting that 
legal tools are only as effective as our reasons and methods for using them. 
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Chapter Three 
Conceptualising IUU Fishing as a Transnational Organised Crime 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The deficiencies of the current fisheries management paradigm are manifest in the 
international and domestic responses to IUU fishing mentioned in the preceding chapter. 
Efforts made so far have neglected addressing parallel organised crime activities associated 
with the fishing industry. The fact of the matter is that IUU fishing is still rife. It is a lucrative 
enterprise crime driven by opportunity for large profits. It is therefore unquestionable that 
there is need for more stringent means to curb ‘fisheries crime’ as it is known colloquially.  
This chapter explores the proposed new approach to IUU fishing as a transnational 
organised crime. It identifies protected interests that justify the criminalisation of IUU 
fishing and considers whether transnational criminalisation would require a nexus between 
IUU fishing and traditional organised crime. The chapter considers the factors that impel 
IUU fishing and fish laundering, namely, the availability of flags and ports of convenience, 
obscure beneficial ownership and illegal transhipping. More importantly, the chapter 
acknowledges that effective transnational criminalisation entails a resolution of how the 
mandates of distinct legal, institutional and policy frameworks designed to address IUU 
fishing, on the one hand, and organised crime, on the other hand, can be co-ordinated. 
3.2   Drivers of IUU Fishing 
Before venturing into whether transnational criminalisation of IUU fishing is the appropriate 
response to the scourge, it is necessary to identify and examine some of its drivers. IUU 
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fishing is a low-capital, low-risk, and high-reward venture. Its prevalence is heightened by 
what Liddick refers to as ‘criminogenic asymmetries’ - weak governance, lack of political will, 
dearth of resources, and incompetent monitoring and enforcement.153 Corruption is the 
Achilles heel, ‘seen as both result and cause that maintains or increases asymmetries’.154 
IUU fishing, however, is primarily attractive to transnational criminal networks and 
flourishes due to a myriad of conditions unique to fishing, that are distinct from traditional 
transnational organised crime. 
To begin with, there is a low chance of detecting illegal activity due to the vastness of 
oceans and limited capacity of states to deploy patrol boats.155 Unlike narcotics crimes, 
illegal fishing activity occurs alongside licit fishing, and there is no total prohibition, which 
makes detection of specific illegal fishing activity a challenge.156 Fish are easily 
transformable, unlike many other smuggled goods. Tactics such as filleting and relabelling 
are used to conceal the original identity.157 International law gives flexibility to vessel 
owners to choose the flag state that will exercise jurisdiction over a vessel.158 Article 94(6) of 
UNCLOS obligates flag states to exercise jurisdiction and control on vessels flying their flags. 
Astonishingly, landlocked countries such as Mongolia have also been operating as flag 
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states, offering flags of convenience to ship-owners.159 This obscures the link between the 
vessel and any immediate owners or users, creating the possibility for shell companies to 
apply for vessel registrations and to conceal the identity of the beneficial owners of ships. 
Law enforcement networks are then faced with the onerous task of tracing the chain of 
ownership through shell companies and back to the beneficial owners.160 This task is 
unfortunately almost never achieved due to the lack of transparency, tedious investigative 
procedures, distorted information networks and the lack of technical capacity. 
In addition, it is mainly vessels carrying flags of convenience that engage in transshipment 
and fish laundering at sea. There is no homogeneity in the regulation of transshipments 
under domestic legal frameworks. For instance, the Ghanaian Fisheries Act prohibits 
transshipping by foreign vessels in national waters,161 while the Marine Living Resources Act 
of South Africa has no provision expressly prohibiting transshipment. ‘Fish are collected by a 
refrigerator vessel from numerous individual fishing vessels, and because they do not fish, 
these collection vessels (or reefers) are often exempt from catch documentation and 
monitoring.’162 The legally obtained fish and illegally captured fish are mixed and then 
brought into the market through ports of convenience, which are typically ports with low 
inspection rates and lax enforcement. Proceeds of the sale of the fish are then transferred 
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through complex financial transactions to tax havens with strict banking secrecy laws, thus 
further obscuring detection.163 
Therefore, simply put, IUU fishing persists because ‘of expansion into new ‘’business 
ventures’’ by transnational organised groups that are easily facilitated within the margins of 
the law by unregulated access to flags of convenience, little regulation of transshipments, 
existence of ports of convenience, and an active business in offshore shell companies and 
tax havens’.164 Law enforcement asymmetries result in a  ‘hydraulic effect’,  that is, 
displacement of illegal activities from one region to another due to pressure on illegal 
fishers in one region.165 In this regard, exploring IUU fishing as a transnational organised 
crime is imperative as a means to harmonise enforcement and protect violated interests. 
3.3   Rationale for Transnational Criminalisation 
IUU fishing, as a compared to other traditional forms of transnational organised crime such 
as human and drug trafficking has been trivialised and placed low on the priority list of law 
enforcement actions. This low prioritisation is, perhaps, reinforced by the perception that it 
is a victimless crime which does not have obvious victims who will readily complain to the 
authorities, even though the crime has long-lasting detrimental effects on the persons 
affected.166 What has emerged is a governance landscape comprised of multiple, unco-
ordinated, international agreements to address this multifaceted crime. Alongside these are 
domestic regulations that serve as symbolic laws, holding more promise than they deliver.  
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This discourse echoes the ‘war on drugs’ archetype of the 1970s in the United States, a 
campaign of prohibition of drugs that saw a dramatic increase in policing efforts through an 
increased number and size of federal drug control agencies.167 Wright remarks that the ‘war 
on’ paradigm has not worked on drugs but has instead increased their price, which is more 
profitable for organised crime syndicates.168 Given the multifaceted nature of transnational 
environmental crime (like IUU fishing), combating it requires a distinct approach to policing. 
It is imperative to ensure that transnational criminalisation, though proposed as a 
supplementary tool, is indeed an appropriate and justifiable tool before creating a crisis of 
‘over-criminalisation’. 
Zoppei, in an article that debates the effect of the use of criminal law to tackle economic 
problems,169  reiterates that ‘the harm principle is of fundamental importance when 
resorting to criminal law’.170 Essentially, ‘harm to a legally protected interest is a conditio 
sine qua non for criminalisation’- ‘there cannot be an offence without the harm to a legally 
protected interest’.171 It was noted in Chapter One that IUU fishing violates sustainable 
marine resources, but the extent to which IUU fishing violates a protected interest justifying 
making it a crime needs clarification. The prodigious nature of IUU fishing causes 
environmental harm by threatening and destroying fisheries resources, thereby reducing 
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future options for the use of resources.172 The environment is recognised as new a collective 
interest protected by law, whereas, previously only individual rights were recognised as 
classic interests protected by law.173 Ancillary to environmental harm is the threat to food 
security and sustainability of vulnerable populations, particularly those engaged in 
subsistence fishing.174 Furthermore, IUU fishing causes economic harm arising from tax 
evasion and illicit financial flows, depriving states of funds - an effect not given much 
attention until recently.175 
The line between the collective and individual interests has been blurred over the years as 
both are dimensions of sustainable development.176 This means that the three identified 
interests of IUU fishing are legally protected interests despite their abstract nature. Based 
on the harm principle, one may posit that transnational criminalisation of IUU fishing 
without a nexus to traditional organised crime is justifiable to the extent that harm to a 
legally protected interest is imminent. Nevertheless, establishing IUU fishing as a 
transnational organised crime needs to meet the scope and ambit of application of the 
United Nations Convention on Transnational Organised Crime (UNCTOC). This is discussed 
below. 
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3.4   IUU Fishing as a Transnational Organised Crime  
Proponents of making IUU fishing a transnational organised crime have written quite 
extensively on the justifications of such an action and the need for a holistic approach to 
IUU fishing, yet there is insufficient literature on how to put this into effect. Coppens 
suggests the conception of a single international criminal law convention ‘with comparable 
obligations of criminalisation’, but provides no further guidance on this.177  This would, 
however, eliminate the problem of ‘too many actors involved in IUU fishing efforts, resulting 
in little individual accountability and no chain of command in terms of strategy and decision 
making’.178  Wright advocates the use of existing policies, calling for further research on 
whether they can be expanded to other areas facing similar problems,179 for example, 
extending the current anti-money laundering and anti-corruption framework to the fishing 
industry. The latter proposition is not far-fetched as it would allow for better use of existing 
frameworks and requires less resources compared to establishing a new framework 
altogether. Telesetsky delves into a more comprehensive discussion of the UNCTOC and IUU 
fishing, augmenting the above two propositions. UNCTOC is put forward as the most viable 
legal framework for linking IUU fishing and organised crime and for harmonising domestic 
fisheries’ laws.180 The discussion that follows will analyse the viability of this proposition. 
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3.4.1 Criminalisation  
UNCTOC is preferred as the most viable legal framework because, unlike the FAO 
Agreement and the IPOA, it has far greater global reach, binding 179 parties.181 It obligates 
states parties to criminalise participation in an organised criminal group,182 and criminalises 
other forms of traditional organised crime, such as corruption183 and money laundering184 
that are said to be rife in the fishing industry. Criminalising IUU fishing under this 
Convention would thus bring ‘fisheries crime’ within the same ambit, standardising 
obligations towards its criminalisation under national laws. Article 3(1)(b) of UNCTOC 
applies to ‘serious crime where the offence is transnational in nature and involves an 
organised criminal group’. In this regard, while IUU fishing is transnational in nature, it ought 
to be characterised as a ‘serious crime’ under domestic laws. This is premised on the 
understanding that UNCTOC has a vertical relationship with the laws of states, and its 
provisions need to be implemented at a domestic level for effective prosecution. 
Serious crime is defined as ‘conduct constituting an offence punishable by a maximum 
deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious penalty’.185 Currently, most 
domestic frameworks do not regard IUU fishing as a serious crime, reflected in the sanctions 
imposed and reluctance to resort to prison sentences. The Ghanaian Fisheries Act, for 
example, prescribes mainly fines and penalty units which are too low to be considered 
serious penalties. Where imprisonment is an option, the maximum deprivation of liberty is 
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at most two years.186 South Africa, by contrast, under its offences and penalties provisions, 
prescribes at most five years’ imprisonment as an option. Where the sentence imposed is at 
least four years, and the punished conduct is committed by an organised group, such 
conduct constitutes transnational organised crime. There is thus no need for a nexus with 
transnational organised crime per se, though it would make for a stronger case. 
It can be deduced that the drafters of domestic fisheries law, particularly the ones discussed 
in this paper, did not have the view to formulate IUU fishing activity as a ‘serious crime’, as 
UNCTOC does. Thus, what is needed is a conscious formulation of IUU fishing as a ‘serious 
crime’ under domestic frameworks, using article 2(b) of UNCTOC as a model. Doing so 
would allow for the prosecution of IUU fishing as a transnational organised crime and 
ensure harmonisation of domestic fisheries laws. It likewise would create an opportunity to 
prescribe more suitable, uniform penalties for such crimes, the severity of which has been 
overlooked historically.187  
3.4.2 Legal Definition  
A clear and globally accepted definition of IUU fishing ought to be devised. While the term 
IUU fishing is currently used without specification of what conduct constitutes a particular 
component, actions such as use of prohibited gear and fishing without a licence, can be 
found in most national fisheries laws. Acknowledging that it is difficult to separate the 
components as they sometimes tend to overlap, the global definition should identify 
common prohibited conduct rather than generically criminalise the contravention of IUU 
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fishing laws. In so doing, satisfying the criminal law principles of legality and certainty, 
expressed by the Latin maxim nulla poena sine lege certa.188  
In the light of this, key acts such as flag hopping and fish laundering, which are recognised 
globally as threatening effective fisheries management, will need to be included in the 
definition as expressly criminalised conduct. Contraventions of IUU fishing, such as those 
stemming from recreational fishing, for instance, may not be grave enough to warrant 
deprivation of liberty for at least four years. Also, as noted in Chapter Two, states tend to 
focus on acts that have historically shaped their fisheries management system, which may 
not be the case for all states. Owing to this, the definition to be adopted under UNCTOC 
should be restricted to conduct generally accepted by all parties to have transnational 
implications and to be of such severity as to warrant stringent punishment. Discretion 
should be given to states on how to regulate and sanction conduct falling out of the scope. 
3.4.3 Prosecuting IUU Fishing as a Transnational Organised Crime 
The challenges that prosecuting IUU fishing cases currently pose and the prospects for 
prosecution of IUU fishing as a transnational organised crime are discussed below.  
3.4.3.1   Access to Information 
Access to information is crucial to building up a case for eventual prosecution. However, 
prosecution of IUU fishing cases is challenging because, as in most transnational crime 
cases, available information is spread across the fisheries network, often across multiple 
jurisdictions.189  The IPOA-IUU identifies participation and co-ordination between states and 
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RFMOs as a primary principle for its effective implementation.190 It requires states to co-
operate directly and through RFMOs, to facilitate information sharing and verification 
regarding fishing.191 These provisions unfortunately do not obligate states to take such 
action, given the non-binding nature of the entire instrument. Information sharing is thus 
left to be taken at states’ own initiative though bilateral and multilateral agreements. In the 
absence of such agreements, the problem of access to information inhibits investigation and 
prosecution of IUU fishing cases.  
Additionally, UNCTOC provides a flexible framework for inter-state legal co-operation. 
Criminalisation of IUU fishing under UNCTOC would allow for increased co-operation 
because it has established mechanisms that provide for information sharing, mutual legal 
assistance, joint investigations, law enforcement co-operation, extradition and witness 
protection, inter alia.192 More importantly, these mechanisms exist within a framework that 
would allow linking IUU fishing investigations to other forms of traditional organised crime. 
This, however, requires domestication of UNCTOC for effective implementation. Lack of 
political will remains a significant challenge to effective co-operation and enforcement of 
relevant provisions. Countries have different levels of commitment to detecting, 
suppressing, and combating fisheries crime, which may not easily be countered through the 
criminal justice system. Peer pressure through the threat of economic sanction has so far 
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proven to be a more effective tool in eliciting commitment and engagement, compelling 
states into action.193 Therefore, legal tools are only as effective as their being used.  
3.4.3.2   Beneficial Ownership 
The ‘lack of transparency of the identity of the beneficial ownership of fishing vessels and a 
lack of international records of fishing vessels’ identity and history’ is one of the identified 
vulnerabilities of the fishing industry to transnational organised crime.194 The Financial 
Action Task Force (FATF) is a standard-setting, inter-governmental body established to 
promote effective implementation of policies to combat money laundering and terrorist 
financing.195 It defines a beneficial owner as ‘the natural person(s) who ultimately owns or 
controls a customer, and/or the natural person on whose behalf a transaction is being 
conducted, including those persons who exercise ultimate effective control over a legal 
person or arrangement’.196 The controlling interest and ownership (beneficial ownership) of 
an entity, in this case of a vessel, are obscured through a myriad of techniques such as re-
flagging and use of flags of convenience, as well as more complex corporate structures. This 
presents the challenge of determining who profits from the IUU fishing enterprise.197 If a 
vessel is apprehended for engaging in IUU fishing or parallel activity, often criminal entities 
opt to surrender the vessel than to disclose the beneficial owner. The criminal enterprise 
continues to thrive under obscurity and the illegal profits continue to fund its operation.  
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A Fisheries Crime Expert Group meeting recommends that there is need to ‘make greater 
use of financial mechanisms within the context of enhancing transparency and traceability, 
to investigate and punish fisheries crimes, in particular with reference to uncovering 
beneficial ownership of vessels and companies throughout supply and value chains’.198 The 
FATF Recommendations on combating money laundering and terrorist financing require 
countries to ‘ensure that there is adequate, accurate and timely information on the 
beneficial ownership and control of legal persons that can be obtained or accessed in a 
timely fashion by competent authorities’.199 Designated non-financial businesses and 
professions (DNFBPs), are required to conduct customer due diligence (CDD), keep records 
and report suspicious transactions to competent authorities requirements.200 This paper 
proposes the inclusion of domestic vessel registration offices as DNFBPs under relevant 
domestic anti-money laundering legal frameworks, subject to CDD, record-keeping and 
reporting suspicious transaction requirements. This would allow them to obtain relevant 
information about vessels to assist competent authorities in ‘identifying the beneficial 
owner, identifying, and managing ML/TF risks, and implementing AML/CFT controls based 
on those risks’.201 Article 7(1)(a) of UNCTOC could serve as the empowering provision for 
this proposal.202 
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3.4.3.3   Whistle blower Protection 
Pertinent to the issue of access to information is whistle-blower protection. IUU fishing 
operations remain clandestine, elusive and difficult to detect because the modus operandi is 
not known to law enforcement officers. Consider, as an example, forced labour and human 
trafficking on the high seas. They flourish because of the isolation of the workplace.203 In 
addition, the lack of anonymity and protection for whistle blowers in the fishing industry 
does not encourage victims to report and provide insight on the ongoing nefarious 
activities.204  
The benefits that could flow from prioritising whistle blower protection as a preventative 
measure for organised crime in general have greatly been overlooked and poorly attended 
to by the transnational organised crime policing discourse. UNCTOC provides for witness 
protection under article 24, but this is a measure after the fact – after detection of criminal 
conduct. Whistle blower protection ought to be prioritised as a core measure to detect 
fisheries crime and deter organised criminal syndicates in the fisheries industry. 
3.4.3.4        Access to Credible Evidence 
A further hindrance to the successful prosecution of IUU fishing cases is the unavailability of 
credible evidence because evidentiary material like logbooks, computers and navigation 
equipment can quickly be discarded.205  This makes it difficult for prosecutors to discharge 
the onus of proof to the required standard. Telesetsky presupposes that courts may, in 
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future, overlook the reliability of isotopic analyses to prove the geographic origin of marine 
cargo. The feasibility of this is uncertain and raises obvious technical challenges for 
developing states.  
Another view to overcome evidentiary challenges is that perhaps the burden of proof could 
be shifted to IUU fishing operators, requiring them to demonstrate the lawful origin of 
alleged proceeds of crime.206 The basic rule in most jurisdictions, if not all, is that he who 
alleges must prove. Reverse onus provisions are contentious in criminal law, on the premise 
that they violate fair trial rights of an accused person, particularly the presumption of 
innocence and the right against self-incrimination. Despite this, they have passed 
constitutional muster in certain jurisdictions, based on the contention that only the 
evidential burden is being shifted and not the burden of proving the constituent elements of 
an offence.207 A case in point is Hong Kong where ‘balancing the interests of the individual 
against those of society in eradicating corruption tipped in favour of society’.208  
Under the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), the reverse onus applies 
to the offence of illicit enrichment, requiring a public official to explain a significant increase 
in his or her wealth in relation to his or her lawful income.209 States are, however, not 
obligated to criminalise illicit enrichment in view of differences in their domestic 
constitutional principles. Following this example, establishing IUU fishing as a transnational 
organised crime gives states the option of including the reverse onus provision under their 
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national fisheries laws.210 Its inclusion could allow judicial expediency and perhaps increase 
prosecutions of IUU fishing cases. 
3.4.3.5   Jurisdiction of Non-Flag States 
The basic tenets of international customary law, later codified in UNCLOS211 and subsequent 
instruments,212 give flag states the primary duty to exercise effective jurisdiction and control 
over their vessels. Section 59 of the IPOA-IUU, for example, requires port states to seek the 
consent of flag states before taking any action against a flag state’s vessel that is reasonably 
suspected of engaging in, or supporting IUU fishing beyond a port state’s jurisdiction. The 
authority and ability of port states to take effective action against IUU fishing is limited to 
territorial jurisdiction, or consent from the flag state. This impedes quick action against IUU 
fishing operators, considering how complex requests for action can be, and the reluctance 
of flag states to enforce their responsibility on vessels.  
A valuable alternative would be extending the jurisdiction of both port and coastal states. 
Article 15 of UNCTOC provides for territorial, active, and passive personality jurisdiction. On 
the assumption that IUU fishing is a transnational organised crime, this article extends the 
jurisdiction by allowing port and coastal states to prosecute IUU fishing offences based on 
the conduct occurring on their territory, or their national being involved. The latter is 
beneficial to states for regulation of their nationals in IUU fishing activities. However, there 
is a limitation on asserting passive personality jurisdiction because IUU fishing is perceived 
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as a victimless crime.213 To this end, Telesetsky submits that concurrent extraterritorial 
jurisdiction should be used for serious IUU fishing offences, thus allowing for the 
prosecution of non-nationals even when territorial or active personality jurisdiction do not 
apply.214  
The justification to end impunity is made with reference to the US Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act215 as an example of ‘extraterritorial jurisdiction over corrupt acts by both U.S. nationals 
and non-nationals who have some nexus with the United States’.216 In the context of IUU 
fishing, national fisheries laws would need to be amended to include an extra-territorial 
provision that allows for the prosecution of non-nationals for serious IUU fishing offences, 
based on the assertion that illegal fish or funds therefrom passed though the particular 
jurisdiction or were destined to be moved there.217 The need for such action can further be 
supported by examples like the smuggling of poached South African abalone into 
jurisdictions that have not criminalised transportation of abalone without a permit, like 
Mozambique.218 It follows that enactment of the provision under domestic fisheries law and 
its subsequent implementation is imperative to deter IUU fishing operators and criminal 
organisations from finding solace in safe havens that lack legislation, reflecting the serious 
                                                          
213  Telesetsky (2015) 990. 
 
214  Telesetsky (2015) 986. 
 
215  Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977. 
 
216  Telesetsky (2015) 987. 
 
217  Telessetsky (2015) 987. 
 
218  Steinberg J ‘The illicit abalone trade in South Africa’ (2005) 4, available at 
http://www.dlist.org/sites/default/files/doclib/Abalone%20Trade%20in%20South%20Africa.pdf 
(accessed 2 January 2017). 
 
 
 
 
 
 58 
 
nature of IUU fishing.219 While this is theoretically sound, the unfortunate reality of lack of 
political will may deter states from following through, unless coerced to do so. States that 
do not suffer the direct consequences of IUU fishing may be reluctant to include such a 
provision as resources would rather be focused on more pertinent issues. But it remains a 
useful suggestion for consideration by policy makers. 
3.5   Multilateral Co-operation 
Multilateral co-operation has always been an important aspect of the fisheries management 
and conservation discourse, with articles dedicated to it, extending from UNCLOS220 to the 
recent IPOA-IUU. However, co-ordinated efforts to conserve marine living resources, let 
alone curb IUU fishing, have been rare. In instances were prosecution and conviction of IUU 
fishing offences have been successful, bilateral or multilateral co-operation has been a 
keystone. In USA v Bengis,221 one of the widely cited IUU fishing cases, the US government 
successfully prosecuted the accused for importing into the USA unlawfully harvested rock 
lobsters. This not only violated South African marine conservation regulations222 but also 
violated provisions of the US Lacey Act,223 which prohibits trade in illegally harvested fish 
and wildlife.224  
Prior to the institution of criminal proceedings in the USA, South African authorities had 
declined to prosecute the individuals, based on a plea bargain concluded, opting to charge 
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the corporation, Hout Bay, with overfishing.225 US authorities submitted a request for 
mutual legal assistance (MLA) to South African authorities, which was premised on a 
bilateral treaty between the two states, as they intended to charge Bengis under the Lacey 
Act. A restitution order was made, requiring the accused to pay jointly and severally an 
amount of $54,883,550 to South Africa.226 This case embodies the far-reaching benefits of 
co-operation in curbing IUU fishing, as the subsequent prosecution of Bengis in the US was 
facilitated by the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) for asset recovery. It further 
demonstrates the rewards of concurrent jurisdiction, illustrating that a plea bargain 
concluded in South Africa with the accused does not preclude his prosecution in the USA.227 
The latter point establishes the Bengis case as a beacon for future fisheries crime law 
enforcement efforts, not only to end impunity, but also in the use of concurrent jurisdiction 
(where one state is unwilling or unable to prosecute) as a deterrent. Furthermore, the 
restitution order made in favour of South Africa proves that IUU fishing is not a victimless 
crime. 
The nature of co-operation has evolved over time, as the urgency in curbing fisheries crime 
as well as gaps in fisheries enforcement propel greater involvement of non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and civil society.  The role of the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, 
an international non-profit, marine wildlife conservation organisation, in the eventual 
capture of the F/V Thunder is a notable example. Through Operation Ice fish, which 
specifically targeted IUU fishing in the Southern Ocean, Sea Shepherd’s ship, Sam Simon, 
rescued 40 crew of the F/V Thunder before the vessel sank in Sao Tome and Principe’s 
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waters.228 This resulted in the eventual conviction of the crew in Sao Tome and Principe 
courts.229 
Recent discussions among States and relevant stakeholders acknowledge the challenge of 
achieving inter-agency co-operation both at national and international level, and agree that 
co-operation is the key to changing the tide, to avoid misusing resources and duplicating 
efforts.230 As noted, IUU fishing is multifaceted, transcending fisheries conservation and the 
auspices of FAO.  The unique features of IUU fishing distinguish it from other forms of 
organised crime.  IUU fishing, even as a transnational organised crime, cannot be effectively 
addressed using the traditional organised crime framework of UNCTOC. A multidisciplinary 
approach is required that incorporates relevant institutional and legislative aspects. For 
clarity’s sake, this paper therefore proposes the adoption of a Protocol to Prevent, Deter 
and Eliminate IUU Fishing. Such a Protocol will supplement the Convention against 
Transnational Organised Crime, as a primary and legally binding instrument addressing IUU 
fishing as well as organised crime in the fishing industry. The Protocol should be 
incorporated into the existing fisheries management concept which focuses on MCS. It 
should also provide for policing and intelligence gathering, which would fill the existing gap. 
This by no means suggests that the FAO is neglecting its role; it needs to work more closely 
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with the UNODC and other institutions with overlapping mandates in the effort to curb IUU 
fishing. 
States and international bodies alike are urged to co-operate by using existing law 
enforcement platforms such as the International Criminal Police Organisation (Interpol), 
which also has a criminal law mandate.231  Interpol is the world’s largest police organisation, 
with high-tech infrastructure, a global presence232 and expertise. More significantly, Interpol 
has a fisheries crime arm, Project Scale, which is significant as an initiative to ‘support 
member countries in identifying, deterring, and disrupting transnational fisheries crime’.233 
It seeks, amongst other things, to establish National Environmental Security Task Forces 
(NESTs) that would facilitate institutional and technical co-operation among national 
agencies (such as customs and tax authorities, police, fisheries departments) and 
international partners.234 Interpol notices, that is, international requests allowing inter-state 
police agencies to share critical crime-related information, have so far been an invaluable 
tool. A purple notice had been issued in the case of the Thunder, prompting relevant 
agencies to be on alert until its eventual capture by Sea Shepherd.235 In the light of the 
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above, Interpol is better placed to harmonise UNODC, FAO and national efforts, ensuring a 
comprehensive, global criminal justice network.236 
3.6   Chapter Conclusion 
To sum up, the concept of IUU fishing as a transnational organised crime, under the United 
Nations Convention against Organised Crime (UNCTOC) framework is feasible and desirable. 
This concept is justified through identification of environmental, economic, and social 
interests as legally protected interests based on the harm principle. The adoption of a 
globally accepted definition of IUU fishing is imperative, and should include, but not be 
limited to, key acts such as flag hopping and transshipping. It follows that IUU fishing 
activities can be identified as criminal conduct without separating the various components 
as they tend to overlap. The proposition to characterise it as a ’serious crime,’ under 
domestic law and bring it within the ambit of UNCTOC is laudable.   
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Chapter Four 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
4.1   Conclusion 
This paper has shown that the existing legal, policy and institutional fisheries management 
discourse has been ineffective in addressing IUU fishing. This can be attributed to 
‘criminogenic asymmetries’ such as weak governance, unco-ordinated efforts, and the lack 
of resources, inter alia. However, what is more evident is that the current dispensation does 
not capture the true nature of the twofold problem in the fisheries sector, namely, IUU 
fishing, on the one hand, and organised crime, on the other. IUU fishing has traditionally 
been addressed in the context of optimal utilisation of marine resources through 
monitoring, control, surveillance and allocation of fishing rights. Although the EU IUU 
Regulation addresses the economic aspect of IUU fishing through market-related measures, 
the reality of the fishing industry as a target for organised crime has been ignored. 
Particularly, document fraud, tax evasion and corruption which have plagued the fisheries 
chain have not been prioritised.  
Academic and institutional research identifies IUU fishing as multifarious and transnational, 
acknowledging that there is need for more stringent measures to address it. There has thus 
been a paradigm shift in perception of IUU fishing as a regulatory issue and greater 
justification for it as a transnational organised crime. Significantly, a recently adopted 
African treaty, the Lomé Charter, expressly acknowledges IUU fishing as a transnational 
organised crime, threatening maritime security, safety and development, together with 
other transnational organised crime. It follows from the research that characterising IUU 
fishing as a transnational organised crime is imperative to fill the lacuna and to supplement 
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current efforts. Environmental, social and economic interests have been identified as legally 
protected interests, justifying making IUU fishing a criminal offence. The nefarious and 
transnational nature of IUU fishing justifies its criminalisation. Therefore, establishing a 
nexus between IUU fishing and traditional organised crime is not a prerequisite for 
criminalisation, though it could make a stronger case for prosecution. Several challenges to 
successful prosecution such as access to information, limited jurisdiction, credible evidence 
and identifying the beneficial owner of vessels, were identified. Perhaps the biggest 
challenge that needs further research is the existence of illicit trade alongside licit trade in 
fishery products. Undoubtedly, a comprehensive, co-ordinated mechanism is required to 
address the above-mentioned challenges and curb organised crime. 
The paper analysed the conceptualisation of IUU fishing as a transnational organised crime 
under the UNTOC framework. Formulating IUU fishing and its ancillary key acts as a ‘serious 
crime’ under domestic frameworks using UNCTOC as a model is highly desirable as it would 
inform the proposed global definition of IUU fishing and attain legal certainty. UNCTOC is 
arguably the most effective way to bring IUU fishing and other forms of traditional 
organised crime within a single framework as it would standardise their criminalisation. It is 
also the most viable option to integrate the mandates of the UNODC and the FAO, the two 
principal international agencies tasked with curbing organised crime and ensuring 
sustainable use of fishery resources, respectively. This will allow co-ordination between the 
UNODC and the FAO, preventing them from having overlapping mandates that result in 
resource wastage. In this regard, the need for multilateral co-operation as a cornerstone of 
efforts to curb fisheries crime, is emphasised.  Interpol, through its fisheries crime arm, 
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Project Scale, and owing to its extensive expertise, is singled out as the lynchpin for 
accomplishing a comprehensive, global, criminal justice network. 
Notwithstanding the above, for this framework to be effective, further considerations ought 
to be made. 
4.2   Recommendations 
This paper proposes the adoption of a Protocol to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate IUU Fishing, 
to supplement the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime. The 
Protocol would be a primary and legally binding instrument addressing IUU fishing as well as 
organised crime in the fishing industry. The recommendation is based on the multifarious 
nature of IUU fishing, which necessitates augmenting the current MCS paradigm and the 
criminalisation of IUU fishing conduct. The protocol should contain a globally accepted legal 
definition of IUU fishing that reflects its true nature as a vice that transcends traditional 
fisheries management, and as an economic enterprise. The paper recommends the use of 
the EU IUU Regulation approach for defining IUU fishing – both an ostensive, that is, 
definition by example, and a general approach.  
Given the obscurity surrounding beneficial vessel ownership and the risk of money 
laundering, the paper recommends that domestic vessel registration offices be included as 
designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBPs). Doing so would bring them 
within the ambit of anti-money laundering legislation. Competent authorities will have ease 
of access to information that may enable them identify the beneficial owners of vessels. 
They would further be better placed to identify and manage ML/TF risks, and implement 
AML/CFT controls based on those risks. It is important for enforcement authorities to 
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deflect attention away from the individual and the vessel, and seek to disclose the 
controlling interest behind the criminal enterprise. In the wider scheme of things, the 
rationale for transnational criminalisation ought to be ending the perpetuity of 
transnational organised criminal syndicates and denying them the advantage of the 
proceeds of their crimes.  
The existing legal tools have been underutilised. Dearth of resources is often cited as a 
convenient excuse for lack of political will. In other instances, inaction is due to other 
pressing commitments stemming from historical inequities. In view of the historical 
underdevelopment of some countries, nearly every instrument addressing IUU fishing 
contains a provision for supporting developing states with technical capacity. This paper 
submits that the aid received through these provisions should be used to set up 
environmental courts as champions of sustainable development. They are advantageous as 
they process cases quickly and capacitate prosecutors with the skills needed to prosecute 
environmental cases. Such specialised courts would contribute hugely to combating 
fisheries crime. Uganda is on the road to establishing environmental courts and overcoming 
the traditional bureaucracy associated with creating new courts.237 More states, particularly 
on the African continent, need to follow suit.  
Clarity is needed on the modus operandi of IUU fishing operators and organised crime 
syndicates in order to formulate more adequate responses to the vices. In view of this, the 
inclusion of a whistle blower protection provision in the Protocol is strongly recommended. 
Greater focus should be placed on identifying potential victims and giving them legal 
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protection. Effective whistle blower protection could further help secure witnesses for 
prosecution of these cases. 
Furthermore, effective monitoring of implementation of UNCTOC at domestic level and the 
proposed Protocol is imperative in the fight against IUU fishing as a transnational organised 
crime. There is thus a need for a mechanism at international level to fulfil this role and 
enhance accountability. The paper proposes amending UNCTOC to establish a Committee of 
states parties responsible for monitoring its implementation. 
These recommendations would ensure effective use of transnational criminalisation as a 
tool to curb fisheries crime. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Word count: 19 462] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 68 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Primary Sources 
International and Regional Instruments 
1. African Union Charter on Maritime Security and Safety and Development in Africa 
(2016). 
2. European Union Regulation on Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (2010). 
3. The FAO Compliance Agreement (1993). 
4. FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (1995). 
5. International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported, and 
Unregulated Fishing (2001). 
6. Port State Measures Agreement (2009). 
7. The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized crime (2003). 
8. The United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (1995). 
9. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982). 
Case Law 
South Africa 
Bengis and Others v Government of South Africa and Others [2016] 2 All SA 459 
(WCC). 
 
 
 
 
 
 69 
 
United States of America 
United States v. Bengis, No. 13-2543 (2d Cir. 2015). 
Legislation  
Ghana 
1. Fisheries Commission Act 457 of 1993. 
2. Fisheries Act 625 of 2002. 
3. National Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported, and 
Unregulated Fishing (2014). 
4. Provisional National Defence Council Law 256 of 1991. 
5. The Wholesale Fish Marketing Act of 1963. 
South Africa 
1. Industry Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries in South Africa (2014). 
2. Marine Living Resources Act 18 of 1998 amended as Marine Living Resources 
Amendment Act 68 of 2000. 
3. The Territorial Waters Act of 1977. 
United States of America 
1. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977. 
2. Lacey Act of 1900. 
 
 
 
 
 70 
 
Reports and Policies of Governmental Bodies 
1. Financial Action Task Force Guidance on Transparency and Beneficial Ownership 
(2014) FATF: Paris. 
2. Ministry of Water and Environmental Affairs Working Paper on Socio-economic 
Contribution of South African Fisheries and their Current Legal, Policy, and 
Management Frameworks (2008) Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism: 
Pretoria. 
3. Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries Annual Report – Agriculture, Forestry, 
and Fisheries (2016) Department of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries: Cape Town. 
4. Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries Policy for the Small-Scale Fisheries 
Sector in South Africa’ (2012) Department of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries: 
Cape Town. 
5. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime World crime trends and emerging Issues 
and responses in the field of crime prevention and criminal justice (2016) Commission 
on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice: Vienna. 
6. United Nations Transnational Organised Crime in the Fishing Industry – Focus on: 
Trafficking in Persons, Smuggling in of Persons (2011) United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime: Vienna. 
7. United Nations Technical Guide to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption 
(2009) United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime: Vienna. 
 
 
 
 
 
 71 
 
Secondary Sources 
Books 
1. Baird RJ Aspects of Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (2006) Springer: 
Dordrecht. 
2. Boister N An Introduction to Transnational Criminal Law (2012) Oxford University 
Press: United Kingdom. 
Chapters in Books 
Palma MA ‘Combatting IUU Fishing: International Legal Developments’ in Hanich Q & 
Tsamenyi M (eds) Navigating Pacific Fisheries: Legal and Policy Trends in the 
Implementation of International Fisheries Instruments on the Western and Central 
Pacific Region (2009) Oceans Publications: Australia. 
Journal Articles 
1. Elvestad C and Kvalvik I ‘Implementing the EU-IUU Regulation: Enhancing Flag State 
Performance Through Trade Measures, Ocean Development & International Law,’ 
(2015) Ocean Development & International Law 241-245. 
2. Folkesson E ‘Human Rights Courts Interpreting Sustainable Development: Balancing 
Individual Rights and the Collective Interest’ (2013) 2 Erasmus Law Review 142-154. 
3. Kleinschmidt H, Sauer W & Britz P ‘Commercial Fishing Rights Allocation in Post-
apartheid South Africa: Reconciling Equity and Stability’ (2003) 25 African Journal of 
Marine Science 25-35. 
 
 
 
 
 72 
 
4. Liddick D ‘Dimensions of a Transnational Organised Crime Problem: the case of IUU 
fishing’ (2014) 17 Trends in Organised Crime 290- 312. 
5. Nunoo F, Asiedu B, Amador K, Belhabhb K, Lam V, Sumaila R & Pauly D ‘Marine 
Fisheries Catches in Ghana: Historic Reconstruction for 1950 to 2010 and Current 
Economic Impacts’ (2014) 22 Reviews in Fisheries Science & Aquaculture 274-283. 
6. Telesetsky A ‘Laundering Fish in the Global Undercurrents: Illegal, Unreported, and 
Unregulated Fishing and Transnational Organized Crime’ (2015) 41 Ecology Quarterly 
939-994.  
7. Wright G ‘Conceptualising Transnational Environmental Crime’ (2011) 14 Trends in 
Organised Crime 332-346. 
Theses and Papers 
1. Kwadjosse T ‘The Law of the Sea: Impacts on the Conservation and Management of 
Fisheries Resources of Developing Coastal States – The Ghana Case Study’ (2009) The 
United Nations: New York. 
2. Sarda SM ‘High Seas Fisheries Regulation Beyond the Scope of International Law of 
the Sea: Prospects of Change’ (LLM thesis, University of Iceland, 2016). 
Internet Sources 
1. Bondaroff T ‘The Illegal Fishing and Organized Crime nexus: Illegal Fishing as a 
Transnational Organized Crime’ (2015) 14 Global Initiative Against Transnational 
Crime, available at http://theblackfish.org/Fishing_Crime.pdf (accessed 17 April 
2016). 
 
 
 
 
 73 
 
2. Coppens L ‘Transnational environmental crime – A common crime in need of better 
enforcement’ (2013), available at 
http://www.illegallogging.info/sites/files/chlogging/uploads/GEASJan2013EnvCrime.
pdf (accessed 20 October 2016) 109. 
3. De Coning E and Witbooi E ‘Towards a new fisheries crime’ paradigm: South Africa as 
an illustrative example’ (2015) Marine Policy, available at 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0308597X1500189X (accessed 8 
July 2016). 
4. De Coning E ‘Transnational organized fisheries crime: INTERPOL project SCALE and 
INTERPOL ad hoc Working Group on Fisheries Crime’, available at 
https://www.ccamlr.org/en/system/files/Day%202%20-%20Session%203%20-
%20Transnational%20Organized%20Fisheries%20Crime%20-
%20Eve%20de%20Conning.pdf (accessed 20 June 2016). 
5. Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism ‘Marine and Coastal Management 
- Seas of Change’ 32, available at 
https://www.environment.gov.za/sites/default/files/docs/10ytearsreview_marine_c
oast.pdf (accessed on  17 May 2016). 
6. FAO ‘The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture Opportunities and challenges’ 
FAO (2014), available at http://www.fao.org/3/a-i3720e.pdf (accessed 15 April 
2016). 
7. Financial Action Task Force, available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/about/ (accessed 
10 August 2016). 
 
 
 
 
 74 
 
8. Finegold C ‘The importance of fisheries and aquaculture to development’ (2009), 
available at http://pubs.iclarm.net/resource_centre/WF_2546.pdf (accessed 17 April 
2016). 
9. Interpol ‘Project Scale’, available at https://www.interpol.int/Crime-
areas/Environmental-crime/Projects/Project-Scale (accessed 12 December 2016). 
10. Interpol ‘Study on Fisheries Crime in the West African Coastal Region’ (2014) 31, 
available at 
https://www.google.co.bw/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&
uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjZ2vSequDRAhUCKCYKHY78D98QFggaMAA&url=https%3A%2
F%2Fwww.interpol.int%2Fcontent%2Fdownload%2F27590%2F369574%2F...%2FWA
CS%2520EN.pdf&usg=AFQjCNFGqRK8oK70_P-ymvM5lo2HzckJwg (accessed on 29 
July 2016).  
11. Jatmiko A “Indonesian authorities bombed the last major ship internationally wanted 
for years of illegally taking tooth fish from southern waters, reiterating a strong 
message to would-be poachers who enter the country's waters” US News, available 
at http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2016-03-14/indonesia-blows-up-
illegal-toothfish-ship-sought-by-interpol  (accessed 14 April 2016). 
12. Kivabulaya F ‘Government to Establish Environmental Courts’, available at 
https://ugandaradionetwork.com/story/government-on-the-move-to-establish-
environmental-courts (accessed 17 January 2016). 
13. Martini M ‘Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and corruption’ (2013) 
Transparency International 5 September 2013, available at 
 
 
 
 
 75 
 
https://www.google.co.bw/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&cad=rja&
uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjq1d3ujOLRAhVnCsAKHZ_fAsQQFggaMAA&url=http%3A%2F%
2Fwww.u4.no%2Fpublications%2Fillegal-unreported-and-unregulated-fishing-and-
corruption%2Fdownloadasset%2F3261&usg=AFQjCNHj_M90f3KRkepzWF-
UIm3i1jwQRQ  (accessed on 10 April 2016). 
14. Oceana ‘The EU IUU Regulation -  Building on success: EU progress in the global fight 
against illegal fishing’ (2015) 6, available at 
http://oceana.org/sites/default/files/oceana_iuu_report_01_02_16_web.pdf 
(accessed 30 August 2016). 
15. Rigg K ‘Halting IUU Fishing: Enforcing International Fisheries Agreements’ (2003), 
available at http://www.imcsnet.org/imcs/docs/halting_iuu_fishing_oceana.pdf 
(accessed 15 May 2016). 
16. Steinberg J ‘The illicit abalone trade in South Africa’ (2005) 4, available at 
http://www.dlist.org/sites/default/files/doclib/Abalone%20Trade%20in%20South%2
0Africa.pdf (accessed 2 January 2017). 
17. Stølsvik CG ‘Transnational organised fisheries crime as a maritime security issue’ 
(2008), available at 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/consultative_process/documents/9_gunnarstolsvikabs
tract.pdf (accessed 14 April 2016). 
18. Stop Illegal Fishing ‘Environmental Courts Prove to be Effective’ 2, available at 
http://static1.1.sqspcdn.com/static/f/157301/9458990/1290011218400/Stop-illegal-
 
 
 
 
 76 
 
fishing-case-study-1.pdf?token=EutwPkm61ocw5XE3E4gq5l8noF0%3D (accessed 26 
July 2016). 
19. United Nations ‘DOALOS/UNITAR Briefing on Developments in Ocean Affairs and the 
Law of the Sea 20 years After the Conclusion of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea’ (2002) United Nations: New York, available at 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_20years/1995Fis
hStockAgreement_ATahindro.pdf (accessed 14 April 2016). 
20. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Fisheries crime: bringing to light the 
perfect storm of illegal activities in the fishing sector (2016), available at 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/2016/May/fisheries-crime_-bringing-to-
light-the-perfect-storm-of-illegal-activities-in-the-fishing-sector.html (accessed 18 
June 2016). 
21. Zoppei V ‘Money Laundering: A New Perspective in Assessing the Effectiveness of 
the AML Regime’ The European Review of Organised Crime (2015) 2 130, available at 
http://sgocnet.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/7_Verena-Zoppei_pp130-
148.pdf (accessed 18 October 2016). 
 
Media and Other Sources 
1. Alexander G ‘Mongolia’s Dubious Merchant Navy’ The Diplomat 20 March 2015, 
available at http://thediplomat.com/2015/03/mongolias-dubious-merchant-navy/ 
(accessed 20 December 2016). 
 
 
 
 
 77 
 
2. Drug Policy Alliance ‘A Brief History of the Drug War’, available at 
http://www.drugpolicy.org/facts/new-solutions-drug-policy/brief-history-drug-war-0 
(accessed 22 December 2016). 
3. FishCRIME ‘Record of The First International Symposium on FishCRIME’ (2016) 17 
available at http://fishcrime.info/assets/FishCRIME2015Record.pdf (accessed 16 
November 2016). 
4. FishCRIME ‘Recommendations of the 2nd International Symposium on Fisheries 
Crime’ (2016), available at http://fishcrime.com/recommendations-of-the-2nd-
international-symposium-on-fisheries-crime/ (accessed 28 November 2016). 
5. House of Ocean ‘IUU: Is it a bird or a plane? Is it illegal fishing, unregulated fishing, or 
crime? Look to  the Fish Stocks Agreement for answers’ (2015), available at 
http://iuufishing.ideasoneurope.eu/2015/10/04/iuu-bird-plane-illegal-fishing-
unregulated-fishing-crime-look-fish-stocks-agreement-answers/ (accessed on 15 
May 2016).  
6. Sea Shepherd ‘Victory Against Illegal Fishing in Antarctica’ 14 March 2016, available 
at http://www.seashepherd.org/news-and-commentary/news/victory-against-
illegal-fishing-in-antarctica.html (accessed 11 January 2017). 
7. Urbina I ‘African Court Convicts Captain of Renegade Ship in Illegal Fishing Case’ New 
York Times 12 October 2015, available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/13/world/africa/african-court-convicts-captain-
of-renegade-ship-in-illegal-fishing-case.html (accessed 11 January 2017). 
 
 
 
 
